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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3883 
 ___________ 
 
 KURT DANYSH,  
   Appellant 
      
 v. 
 
ELI LILLY and COMPANY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-2116) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 12, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : January 31, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Kurt Danysh appeals the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment to the defendant, Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”).  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of review.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. 
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Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 This action concerns Lilly’s drug Prozac.  A doctor prescribed Prozac for Danysh 
on April 8, 1996.  On April 25, 1996, a few days after discontinuing his use of the drug, 
Danysh shot and killed his father. 
 Danysh confessed to the crime, and almost immediately attributed his behavior to 
Prozac.  He said that the medication caused him to “act differently,” so that “when 
something bother[ed] [him], it bother[ed] [him] to extreme.”  However, despite Danysh’s 
suspicions, he was unable to find evidence to support his theory, and he ultimately 
pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania state court.  In November 1997, the trial court sentenced 
him to 22.5 to 60 years’ imprisonment, and the Superior Court affirmed. 
 In May 2003, Danysh filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction 
Relief Act (PCRA).  He claimed that he had discovered new evidence linking Prozac to 
violent behavior.  In support of his petition, he presented a letter from Donald H. Marks, 
M.D., Ph.D., stating that “a wide body of scientific literature” showed that Prozac “would 
be capable of interfering with thought and judgment to enough a degree to interfere with 
your ability to understand the significance of a violent act.”  Danysh also submitted 
records of adverse reactions associated with Prozac and an article by three psychiatrists 
concerning side effects of antidepressant drugs.  He continued to supplement his petition, 
and in July 2004, presented 31 additional exhibits that purportedly “highlight[ed] 
Prozac’s ability to cause violent/suicidal behavior in individuals” and “indicate[d] that 
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the manufacturers of Prozac . . . have purposely hid[den] the dangers associated with 
these drugs, including their potential to cause violent behavior.”   
 The PCRA courts denied all relief to Danysh.  Nevertheless, he continued to 
research his theory.  In August 2008, he allegedly learned that he was a “poor 
metabolizer of Prozac,” which caused him to be “abnormally susceptible to the negative 
side effects of Prozac.”  Then, in 2009, he read an article reporting, based on Lilly’s 
internal documents, that the company had known since 1988 that Prozac could cause side 
effects like the ones that he allegedly experienced.   
 On August 16, 2010, Danysh instituted this civil action.  He claimed, under state 
law, that Lilly had committed fraud and negligence, violated the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), and breached an express 
warranty.  Danysh alleged, at bottom, that Lilly had unlawfully failed to warn him that 
Prozac could cause violent behavior.   
 A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that Lilly was 
entitled to summary judgment because Danysh’s action was barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations.  The District Court approved and adopted the report and 
recommendation, and Danysh then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.   
 We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.  Pennsylvania law, 
which governs this diversity action, see Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 
2006), provides varying statutes of limitations for Danysh’s different causes of actions.  
These limitation periods range from two years (fraud and negligence, see Ash v. Cont’l 
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Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 2007)) to six years (the UTPCPL, see Lesoon v. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co., 898 A.2d 620, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).  For the sake of simplicity, and 
because it does not affect the result of this case, we will proceed as if all of Danysh’s 
claims were subject to the six-year statute of limitations. 
 The statute of limitations begins to run on the date that “the cause of action 
accrued.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5502(a).  A cause of action accrues “when the injury is 
inflicted.”  Fine v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 857 (Pa. 2005).  Danysh’s causes of action 
therefore accrued in 1996, when he was allegedly injured by the defendant’s failure to 
warn him of Prozac’s possible side effects.  See generally id.; see also William A. 
Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 150 (3d Cir. 2011) (“the ‘accrual’ of a cause of 
action occurs at the moment at which each of its component elements has come into 
being as a matter of objective reality”).  Therefore, the statute of limitations 
presumptively began to run in 1996 and expired long before Danysh filed his August 
2010 complaint.   
 Danysh argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled pursuant to the 
discovery rule or the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.  We agree with the District 
Court that these doctrines do not help Danysh here.   
 Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations “does not begin to run until the 
injured party discovers or reasonably should discover that he has been injured and that his 
injury has been caused by another party’s conduct.”  Fine, 870 A.2d at 859.  More 
specifically, the limitations period commences upon the plaintiff’s “actual or constructive 
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knowledge of at least some form of significant harm and of a factual cause linked to 
another’s conduct, without the necessity of notice of the full extent of the injury, the fact 
of actual negligence, or precise cause.”  Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 
(Pa. 2011). 
 Here, the undisputed evidence shows that Danysh knew of his injury and Lilly’s 
alleged role in July 2004, when he provided a wealth of evidence to the PCRA court in 
support of his claim that Prozac had caused him to behave violently and that Lilly had 
fraudulently withheld its knowledge of the drug’s side effects.  While Danysh contends 
that the discovery rule should toll the limitations period until August 2008 when he 
discovered that he was a “poor metabolizer of Prozac” or sometime in 2009 when he 
learned of the defendants’ internal documents, he had unquestionably 
“discover[ed] . . . that he ha[d] been injured and that his injury ha[d] been caused by 
another party’s conduct” well before those dates.  Fine, 870 A.2d at 859; see generally 
Zeleznik v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that the limitations 
period is “not postponed until the injured party knows every fact necessary to bring his 
action”).  Therefore, the District Court correctly rejected Danysh’s discovery-rule 
argument as a matter of law. 
 Likewise, we agree with the District Court that the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment does not render Danysh’s claim timely.  Under this doctrine, “the defendant 
may not invoke the statute of limitations, if through fraud or concealment, he causes the 
plaintiff to relax his vigilance or deviate from his right of inquiry into the facts.”  Fine, 
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870 A.2d at 860.  However, even if a limitation period is tolled by virtue of fraudulent 
concealment, it will begin “to run when the injured party knows or reasonably should 
know of his injury and its cause.”  Id. at 861.  As discussed above, reasonable minds 
would not differ in finding that Danysh knew of his injury and its alleged cause, at the 
latest, in July 2004, more than six years before he instituted this action.  Hence, his 
claims are time barred.   
 Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the defendant.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
